Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency, Order on Defendant\u27s Motion to Dismiss by Long, Elizabeth E.
Georgia State University College of Law
Reading Room
Georgia Business Court Opinions
1-21-2015
Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency,
Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Elizabeth E. Long
Fulton County Superior Court, Judge
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Business Organizations
Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons
This Court Order is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Business Court Opinions
by an authorized administrator of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Institutional Repository Citation
Long, Elizabeth E., "Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency, Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss" (2015). Georgia Business
Court Opinions. 339.
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/businesscourt/339














JAN 2 1 20'5 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON C 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
GEORGIA INTERLOCAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT FULTON COUNTY, GA 
Civil Action No. 2014CV248848 
v. 
CITY OF SANDY SPRINGS, 
Defendant. co~ 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
On January 7, 2015, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on 
Defendant City of Sandy Springs Motion to Dismiss.l Upon consideration of the argument of 
the parties and the briefs submitted on the Motion, this Court finds as follows: 
Georgia Interlocal Risk Management Agency ("GIRMA") filed this declaratory action 
seeking a determination whether or not it was required to defend the City of Sandy Springs (the 
"City") in ongoing litigation brought by adult entertainment businesses (collectively, 
"Flanigan's") involving constitutional and civil rights claims. Flanigan's first sued the City in 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia in 2006 challenging certain zoning 
and licensing legislation that affected their businesses. This case was dismissed by the Court 
with leave to renew ("Flanigan's /"). On October 5, 2009, Flanigan's filed a renewal 
complaint, again alleging constitutional and civil rights violations ("Flanigan's IF'). GIRMA's 
obligation to defend the City in Flanigan's II is at issue in this declaratory action. 
I Following the hearing, GIRMA filed its First Amendment to Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment. The City responded by filing its answer and its Motion to Dismiss GIRMA's First 
Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint and the subsequent Motion to Dismiss are both 
considered herein. 
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The Original Complaint in Flanigan IS II did not seek monetary damages and the parties 
do not dispute that GIRMA did not have an obligation to defend the suit. Regardless, GIRMA 
issued a Reservation of Rights letter on December 9, 2009, stating that it would defend the City, 
but notifying the City that the Coverage Agreement "may not provide coverage due to certain 
exclusions," in particular, an exclusion for "any claim seeking equitable relief, redress or any 
other claim seeking relief in any form other than money damages." On March 10, 2010, 
Flanigan's filed an Amended Complaint in Flanigan IS II which also did not seek monetary 
damages. 
On December 13,2011, the City filed a nuisance suit against Flanigan's in Fulton County 
Superior COUli, seeking to enjoin activities that it alleged violated the City's Code and Georgia 
criminal statutes. On JUl1e 20, 2012, in response to this nuisance suit, Flanigan's again amended 
its Complaint in Flanigan IS II. This Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief and Damages added allegations that the City's nuisance suit was filed in retaliation of 
Flanigan's renewing its action in federal court and sought nominal and compensatory damages. 
On February 1, 2013, GIRMA issued a second Notice of Reservation of Rights amending and 
restating the earlier Notice of Reservation of Rights dated December 9, 2009. The Notice stated 
that GIRMA would continue to provide a defense, but reserved GIRMA's right to deny coverage 
and indemnity for any settlement or judgment, and reserved "the right to recover advanced 
defense incurred by GIRMA from this date forward and/or indemnity costs from the City if it is 
determined that GIRMA was not obligated to defend the claim." GIRMA requested the City's 
acknowledgement and consent by signature. The City did not sign the acknowledgement. 
Flanigan IS 11 is still pending before the U.S. District Court although some of Flanigan's 
claims, including claims for damages arising from the allegedly retaliatory nuisance suit, were 
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dismissed in an April 9, 2014 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have 
indicated that an appeal of the summary judgment ruling is likely. 
The applicable provisions of the Coverage Agreement between the City and GIRMA are 
as follows: 
GIRMA shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the Member 
claiming money damages for an Occurrence or Wrongful Act during the 
Coverage Agreement Period for which coverage is afforded under this 
Agreement, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or 
fraudulent, ... [Coverage Agreement at p. 11]; 
"Wrongful Act" includes actual or alleged violations of the United States 
Constitution, or any State Constitution, or any law affording protection for Civil 
Rights. [Coverage Agreement at p. 14]; 
GIRMA hereby agrees, subject to the definitions, exclusions, limitations, terms 
and conditions herein mentioned to pay on behalf of the Named Member all 
money damages incurred by the Named Member by reason of any Wrongful Act 
committed during the Coverage Agreement Period. [Coverage Agreement at p. 
36]; 
[A]ny claim arising out of or in any way connected with any claim seeking 
equitable relief, redress or any other claim seeking relief in any form other than 
money damages [is excluded from coverage]. [Coverage Agreement at p. 6]. 
See Compl., Ex. 1. 
GIRMA seeks a declaration that money damages are not at issue in Flanigan's II and that 
the policy exclusion for claims seeking "other than money damages" applies. Specifically, the 
prayer for relief in GIRMA's Complaint seeks a determination that (a) the Flanigan's II claims 
are not covered by the policy, (b) GIRMA is not obligated to pay for damages arising out of the 
Flanigan's Illitigation, (c) GIRMA does not have a duty to defend the City in Flanigan's II, (d) 
GIRMA can deny coverage for claims that arose in Flanigan's II because of the nuisance action, 
and (e) the City is liable for costs incurred by GIRMA since February 1, 2013, the date GIRMA 
issued the amended Notice of Reservation of Rights. 
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"A motion to dismiss pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) will not be sustained unless 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled 
to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant 
establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the 
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought." Facility Inv., LP v. Homeland Ins. 
Co. of New York, 321 Ga. App. 103, 104 (2013). (quoting Northway v. Allen, 291 Ga. 227,229 
(2012)). 
The duty to defend is determined by the language of the insurance contact and the 
allegations of the complaint against the insured. See Penn-America Ins. Co. v. Disabled 
American Veterans, 268 Ga. 564, 565 (1997). Only where "the complaint sets forth true factual 
allegations showing no coverage" will the insurer be excused from providing a defense. Id. 
"[Tjhe duty to defend exists if the claim potentially comes within the policy. Where the claim is 
one of potential coverage, doubt as to liability and insurer's duty to defend should be resolved in 
favor of the insured." Id. (Citations omitted); see also BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving 
Co., 285 Ga. App. 494, 497 (2007) (quoting City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 
231 Ga. App. 206 (1998)) ("If the facts as alleged in the complaint even arguably bring the 
occurrence within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend the action,"). 
"[A]n insurer's duty to pay and its duty to defend are separate and independent 
obligations." See Penn-Am. Ins. Co, v. Disabled Am. Veterans, Inc., 268 Ga. 564, 565 (1997) 
(quoting Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Us. Fire Ins. Co., 180 Ga. App. 413, 416 (1986)). 
Because GIRMA seeks a declaration related to both, they are discussed below in turn. 
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I. The Duty to Defend 
It is undisputed that GIRMA defended and continues to defend the City in Flanigan's 1 
and 11. It is also clear from the face of the Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief and Damages, the operable complaint in the underlying action, that money 
damages have been sought. Therefore, under clear Georgia precedent, GIRMA has a duty to 
defend the City. See Penn-America Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. at 565. 
GIRMA argues that the only Flanigan's 11 claim seeking money damages "arises out of' 
or is "connected with" the City's nuisance suit because the claim was one for retaliation and 
would not have been filed in the Second Amended Complaint "but for" the filing of the nuisance 
action. GIRMA reasons that the claim for money damages should be excluded because it is 
"arising out of' the nuisance suit brought by the City which sought only equitable relief. The 
City disagrees, noting that the claims in Flanigan's 11 would be covered under the clear language 
of the Coverage Agreement despite the exclusion because Flanigan's is seeking money damages 
in its claims against the City. The City further argues that the nuisance action is not a "claim" 
within the meaning of the exclusion. Expanding the definition of "claim" beyond the claims 
brought in Flanigan's 11 to include the nuisance claims brought by the City against Flanigan's 
would effectively allow GIRMA to withdraw its defense for an otherwise covered claim 
whenever the insured asserted a nonmonetary claim against its opponents. The Court finds 
GIRMA's argument unavailing, and declines to interpret the exclusion so broadly. 
The trial court is "obligated to strictly construe the language of the policy exclusion in 
favor of the insured." See Hoover v. Maxum Indem. Co., 291 Ga. 402, 418 (2012). Here, it is 
unreasonable to construe this exclusion as GIRMA suggests, as it would exclude coverage 
simply because the City exercised its legal rights in a separate action. As such, the Court holds 
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that the claims brought against the City are arguably covered by the Coverage Agreement, and 
GIRMA has a duty to defend the City in Flanigan's 11 under the plain language of the Coverage 
Agreement. The Court hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the extent that the Complaint 
seeks a determination that GIRMA does not have a duty to defend. 
II. Coverage Under the Policy/Indemnification 
Whether GIRMA will be ultimately liable to indemnify the City is a separate issue from 
the duty to defend. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Ga. Athletic Assn'n, Inc., 288 Ga. 
App. 355,364 (2007). It is not for this Court to decide whether the claim for money damages in 
the underlying suit is meritorious or groundless. The underlying action is still pending and the 
parties agree that certain rulings in that case will be appealed. Therefore, any determination as to 
whether the policy covers the claims brought is premature and would be the result of an 
impermissible advisory opinion. As such, the COUli hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the 
extent that the Complaint seeks a determination as to indemnification of coverage under the 
policy, an impermissible advisory opinion. 
III. Reimbursement of Costs of Litigation 
Finally, GIRMA argues that it is entitled to recover litigation costs incurred in the 
Flanigan's 11 litigation since February 1, 2013. GIRMA has not presented a contract provision 
in the Coverage Agreement that creates a right to reimbursement for litigation costs spent since 
the issuance of the Amended Reservation of Rights. GIRMA argues that even though the City 
did not execute a copy of the Amended Reservation of Rights letter, it impliedly consented by 
continuing to accept GIRMA's defense and by engaging in conversations regarding the defense 
and GIRMA's chosen defense counsel (apparently the City had recommended this counsel, but 
of course GIRMA had no duty to hire him). Even taking all of GIRMA's allegations concerning 
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their discussions as true, as set forth in the First Amendment to Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment, GIRMA cannot get around the fact that there was no agreement between the patties as 
evidenced by GIRMA's filing this Declaratory Judgment action as it had threatened in the 
February 1,2013 Reservation of Rights letter. As noted above, GIRMA has an ongoing duty to 
defend. Finding no basis in law or contract for the reimbursement of litigation costs, the Court 
hereby GRANTS the City's Motion to the extent that the Complaint seeks reimbursement of 
defense costs in Flanigan's 1I. 
-so\-- 
SO ORDERED this 21 -day of January, 2015. 
The Honora Ie Elizabeth E. Long 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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